“It is probably true of political parties as of individuals that they become most introspective following failure.” What does history tell us about the DNC’s ability to go forward after the 2024 Presidential election loss? I recently discussed The Losing Parties, but other political scientists have evaluated the roles of “out-party” national committees (i.e. the national committee when the presidency is held by the other party). Politics without Power: The National Party Committees, Cornelius P. Cotter and Bernard C. Hennessy, Transaction Pub., 1964, is dated in some ways, but still provides relevant observations.
The party chair is one among several “leaders” of the out party, the others being “the titular leader, the defeated presidential candidate,” party leaders in the two houses of Congress, successful party leaders (mostly governors) of major states. I would add former presidents and presidential hopefuls to that list.
Focusing on public relations (what we now call communications or messaging), the authors conclude that: “One of the peculiar and especially trying limitations of the national chairman’s job is he is expected to be an image-maker without being a policymaker. An out-party chairman may occasionally make a sortie into policy-making terrain, but he does so at the risk of being shot at by his own army as well as by the enemy. The in-party chairman is ordinarily expected to make no forays into policy at all.” Moreover, the chair is expected to deal primarily with generalized public attitudes and emotions, not issues. This is clearly a tough assignment.
People will look to the chair “for policy guidance as well as for the magic formula for electoral victory.” The chair may have advisory groups or committees to help formulate party policy, but that may conflict with policies of elected officials. The authors, however, acknowledge the party’s role in what was called public relations, “a steady flow of hard-hitting propaganda aimed at keeping the party in public favor.”
Out-parties have periodically created policy advisory committees to draft issue positions in advance of national conventions, and sometimes even in connection with mid-term conferences. One well known foray into policy leadership was the 1956-1960 Democratic Advisory Counsel, involving former president Harry Truman, Adlai Stevenson, Eleonor Roosevelt, Dean Acheson, John Kenneth Galbraith, and other thought leaders. Congressional leaders Speaker Sam Rayburn and Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson were invited, but declined to participate. In fact, some congressional leaders commented that the best thing the DAC could do for the party was to go out of business. One important reason for Congressional hostility was the pro-civil rights (and other “liberal” positions) the Advisory Council took. The DAC produced over 60 pamphlets and statements including proposals for liberal policies and criticisms of the Eisenhour administration. The DAC became, in effect, America’s first shadow cabinet, but “died of uselessness” at the 1960 Democratic National Convention as the JFK campaign took over policy.
By the way, in 1959, the Republican National Committee created an “Arts and Sciences Division,” concluding that “Anti-intellectualism is a harmful image for a party to project in an era in which education and science have become paramount issues of public policy and loom prominently in the minds of American voters.”